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CRIMINAL LAW—“BUT I DIDN’T  KNOW  WHO  HE  WAS!”: 
WHAT IS THE REQUIRED MENS REA FOR AN AIDER AND ABETTOR 
OF A FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM? 
INTRODUCTION 
Adam stands outside a post office holding a handgun under his 
jacket.  He slides the weapon out from under his jacket and hands it 
to his partner, Pete.  This is not Pete’s first turn at this game.  Ten 
years ago he was convicted of armed robbery of a post office, a 
federal felony offense carrying a penalty of up to five years in 
prison.1  A moment later, Pete runs into the post office, brandishing 
the gun at the postal workers, and takes fistfuls of money from the 
cash register.  Adam stands lookout.  A witness on the street sees 
the encounter and phones the police.  Within minutes the police 
arrive, and the two men are arrested. 
Each man faces a litany of charges.  Pete is charged with, 
among other crimes, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)—being a con­
victed felon in possession of a firearm2—a crime punishable, under 
18 U.S.C. § 924(b), by up to ten years in prison and a $10,000 fine.3 
Whether Pete, as the principal offender, knew he was a convicted 
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2115 (2006).  The statute provides, 
Whoever forcibly breaks into or attempts to break into any post office, or 
any building used in whole or in part as a post office, with intent to commit in 
such post office, or building or part thereof, so used, any larceny or other 
depredation, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both. 
Id. 
2. Id. § 922(g)(1).  The statute provides, 
It shall be unlawful for any person—(1) who has been convicted in any 
court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year 
. . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or 
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce. 
Id. 
3. Id. § 924(b).  The statute provides, 
Whoever, with intent to commit therewith an offense punishable by im­
prisonment for a term exceeding one year, or with knowledge or reasonable 
cause to believe that an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term ex­
ceeding one year is to be committed therewith, ships, transports, or receives a 
firearm or any ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce shall be fined 
under this title, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 
Id. 
245 
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felon is of no matter; he is strictly liable so long as he willfully pos­
sessed the firearm.4  As is customary with federal crimes involving 
multiple defendants, our original character, Adam, faces a charge of 
aiding and abetting the crimes with which his partner is charged and 
is subject to the same punishment.5  Among the crimes he will be 
charged with is aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a fire­
arm.6  If he can convince a jury that he did not know his partner 
was a convicted felon, can Adam avoid a conviction on this charge? 
What is the required “mens rea”7 for this crime? 
Due to a split among the federal courts of appeals, the answer 
to that question depends upon where the alleged crime was commit­
ted.8  For example, if the post office had been located in Jackson­
ville, Florida, Adam could still receive up to ten years in prison for 
aiding and abetting alone even if he can convince a jury that he had 
no knowledge of his partner’s criminal record.9  This is because the 
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have not read mens rea into the statute 
beyond knowledge that the individual in question has aided the 
principal in the possession of a firearm.10  Set this hypothetical in 
Knoxville, Tennessee, and proof that Adam had no prior knowl­
edge of his partner’s record may spare him the conviction because 
4. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. R 
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2.  The statute provides, 
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
 
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
 
principal.
 
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
 
by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable
 
as a principal.
 
Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 81 (9th ed. 2009) (defining aid and abet: “[t]o 
assist or facilitate the commission of a crime, or to promote its accomplishment”). 
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 2. 
7. Latin for “guilty mind,” Black’s Law Dictionary defines mens rea as
 
[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove
 
that a defendant had when committing a crime; criminal intent or recklessness
 
<the mens rea for theft is the intent to deprive the rightful owner of the prop­
erty>. Mens rea is the second of two essential elements of every crime at com­
mon law, the other being the actus reus—Also termed mental element;
 
criminal intent; guilty mind.
 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (9th ed. 2009). 
8. See United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804, 811-12 (7th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135, 142-43 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gardner, 
488 F.3d 700, 720 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (3d Cir. 
1993); United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d. 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Moore, 936 F.2d 1508, 1525-28 (7th Cir. 1991). 
9. See Lesure, 262 F. App’x at 142-43. 
10. See id.; Canon, 993 F.2d. at 1442; Moore, 936 F.2d at 1508; see also discussion 
infra Part III.A. 
247 
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the Sixth Circuit, along with the Third and Seventh Circuits, has 
ruled that some greater knowledge than merely acting to make the 
possession come about is required for a conviction on the charge of 
aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a firearm.11  What if the 
robbery had occurred in Springfield, Massachusetts?  The First Cir­
cuit and all other circuits not previously mentioned have yet to ad­
dress this question, leaving speculation as to the future of this issue 
in those circuits. 
Until Congress acts, this issue will remain one of judicial inter­
pretation.  Thus far, five circuits have ruled on the issue, and each 
has used a different reasoning.12  A congressional amendment or 
overhaul of the law in this area is required.  This Note will argue 
that until such a time as Congress addresses this issue, courts con­
fronted with this issue should find that the alleged aider must have 
some greater knowledge than merely that the principal is a felon in 
possession of a firearm.13  Though Congress has left the courts with 
an unclear view of its intention, the Third and Sixth Circuits pro­
vide a logical solution and predictable standard that other courts 
should follow. 
Those courts of appeals that propose a standard that does not 
require knowledge of the principal’s status as a felon point to the 
general aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, which requires 
that aiders and abettors be treated as principals.14  This analysis is 
too simplistic and fails to recognize the broad scope of the Gun 
Control Act of 196815 and the subsequent Firearms Owners Protec­
tion Act.16  Further, it is felled by the fact that to enforce this read­
ing of the issue, the courts must read certain aspects of the law in 
this area out of the United States Code (the “Code”) or as redun­
dancies within the Code.  This is an inadequate reading of the issue. 
This Note will first set out the history of aiding and abetting 
law, as well as the history of the felon-in-possession statute.  This 
discussion will demonstrate the strength of the proposition that 
some knowledge beyond mere knowledge of possession of the fire­
arm must be required to convict for aiding and abetting a felon in 
11. Gardner, 488 F.3d at 715; Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286-87; see Samuels, 521 F.3d at 
811-12; see also discussion infra Part III.B. 
12. See discussion infra Part III. 
13. Gardner, 488 F.3d at 715; Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286-87; see Samuels, 521 F.3d at 
811-812; see also discussion infra Part III.B. 
14. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
15. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213. 
16. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006)). 
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possession of a firearm.  This Note will then discuss relevant case 
law and the methods of statutory interpretation.  Finally, this Note 
will present several hypothetical fact patterns that will demonstrate 
the problems inherent in the jurisdictions requiring no knowledge 
beyond that of possession, and the strengths—and shortcomings— 
of jurisdictions ruling that an alleged aider must have some knowl­
edge of the principal offender’s status as a convicted felon. 
This Note recommends that some greater knowledge than 
merely knowingly taking action that places the felon in possession 
of the firearm must be required; that is to say that the knowledge of 
the aider as to the felon status of the principal is an issue that the 
courts and juries must consider.  However, ultimately this Note im­
plores Congress to clarify the issue by directly addressing the felon-
in-possession statute and its relation to aiding and abetting law and 
its ancient roots.17 
I. 18 U.S.C. § 2—HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF AIDING AND
 
ABETTING LAW
 
The concept of accomplice liability predates American law.18 
In United States v. Peoni, a preeminent case in the area of aiding 
and abetting law, Judge Learned Hand traced the long history of 
aiding and abetting law as far back as Fourteenth Century En­
gland.19  In both the United States and England, a long tradition of 
17. While this Note will take a unique angle of analysis on this issue—including 
addressing the potentially contradictory rulings of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit—it is not the first piece of scholarship to address the split and its consequences. 
See Stephen R. Klein, Note, A Shot at Mens Rea in Aiding and Abetting Illegal Firearms 
Possession Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 639 (2009).  In his Note, 
Klein argues that “the split should be resolved legislatively by restricting § 922(g) 
charges via § 2(a).” Id. at 641.  Klein, who presents his Note from a solidly pro-gun­
owners’-rights point of view concludes that congressional action is necessary to create 
uniformity on this matter. Id. at 665-66.  He reasons that it is in the best interests of 
those advocating gun owner rights to require a knowledge element, as a failure to do so 
could be used against lawful gun owners by gun control advocates. Id. at 667. 
This Note will not offer a political or ideological opinion on this matter, nor will it 
suggest a particular politically motivated amendment.  It will, however, seek to address 
uniformity and fairness in this issue. 
18. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938); see also Baruch 
Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and 
Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1344 (2002). 
19. Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402.  The court noted,
 
The substance of that formula goes back a long way. Pollock & Maitland, Vol.
 
II, p. 507, in speaking of the English law at the beginning of the 14th Century,
 
say that already ‘the law of homicide is quite wide enough to comprise . . .
 
those who have ‘procured, counselled, commanded or abetted’ the felony’; cit­
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common-law aiding and abetting law exists.20  English common law 
separated the parties to a felony into four categories: principals who 
committed the crime, principals who were present at the scene and 
aided and abetted the commission of the crime, accessories before 
the crime, and accessories after the commission of the crime.21 
Under English law, this construction was often one of semantics 
rather than practicality as punishments were nearly always identi­
cal.22 As with many aspects of English common law, aiding and 
abetting law crossed the Atlantic and became a part of American 
common law.23 
A. A History of Aiding and Abetting in American Law 
By all accounts, the English formulation became overly bur­
densome, ineffective, and eventually untenable.24  In enacting the 
Alaska territory penal code in 1899, Congress began to chip away at 
the common law and required that “all persons concerned in the 
commission of a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and 
ing Bracton, f. 142, as follows: ‘for it is colloquially said that he sufficiently kills
 
who advises’ (praecipit) the killing.
 
Id. 
20. See id.; see also Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15 (1980) (discussing 
the early common law rule that an accessory could not be convicted unless the principal 
offender was formerly convicted); 4 WILLIAM  BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *33 (“A 
man may be principal in an offense in two degrees.  A principal, in the first degree is he 
that is the actor or absolute perpetrator of the crime; and, in the second degree, he who 
is present, aiding, and abetting the fact to be done.”). See generally Rollin M. Perkins, 
Parties to Crime, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 583-623 (1941) (discussing the history of aiding 
and abetting law). 
21. See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 15.  The court stated,
 
In felony cases, parties to a crime were divided into four distinct categories:
 
(1) principals in the first degree who actually perpetrated the offense; (2) prin­
cipals in the second degree who were actually or constructively present at the
 
scene of the crime and aided or abetted its commission; (3) accessories before
 
the fact who aided or abetted the crime, but were not present at its commis­
sion; and (4) accessories after the fact who rendered assistance after the crime
 
was complete.
 
Id. 
22. See 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE  CRIMINAL  LAW OF  ENGLAND 231 
(1882) (“Stated in the broadest and most unqualified way it came to this.  There was no 
distinction between principals and accessories in treason or misdemeanour, and the dis­
tinction in felony made little difference, because all alike, principals and accessories, 
were felons, and were, as such, punishable with death.”). 
23. See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 16. 
24. Weiss, supra note 18, at 1358 (stating that “with the introduction of sentenc- R 
ing discretion . . . the common-law distinctions became an unnecessary burden”); see 
also Standefer, 447 U.S. at 16 (“Not surprisingly, considerable effort was expended in 
defining the categories . . . . In the process, justice all too frequently was defeated.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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whether they directly commit the act constituting the crime or aid 
and abet [in] its commission, though not present, are principals, and 
[are] to be tried and punished as such.”25  Congress continued to 
move in this direction by enacting a similar provision for the Dis­
trict of Columbia in 1901.26  Finally, Congress enacted a national 
statute to address aiding and abetting in 1909, stating, “Whoever 
directly commits any act constituting an offense defined in any law 
of the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or 
procures its commission, is a principal.”27  The statute was initially 
codified as 18 U.S.C. § 550,28 and in 1948 it was moved to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2.29  The result was a criminal justice system that treated all per­
petrators, be they principals or accessories, the same.30 
In 1951, the statute was amended to change the language “is a 
principal” to “is punishable as a principal.”31  This change, which 
has been referred to by one commentator as “a pro-prosecution 
amendment,”32 prevented the defense from arguing that a defen­
dant could not be “a principal” because he was not part of the class 
covered by the criminal statute.33  To be a member of a statute’s 
required class is to be a member of the group described by the lan­
guage of the statute that should be subject to that law.34  As dis­
25. Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 429, § 186, 30 Stat. 1253, 1282; see also Standefer, 447 
U.S. at 17-18 (discussing this change in law). 
26. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 908, 31 Stat. 1189, 1337; see also Standefer, 447 
U.S. at 18 (discussing this change in law). 
27. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 332, 35 Stat. 1088, 1152. 
28. 18 U.S.C. § 550 (1940). 
29. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 684. 
30. Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620, 628 (1926) (“Section 332 of the Crim­
inal Code abolishes the distinction between principals and accessories and makes them 
all principals.  One who induces another to commit perjury is guilty of subornation 
under § 126 and, by force of § 332, is also guilty of perjury.” (citation omitted)). 
31. Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 17b, 65 Stat. 710, 717. 
32. Adam Harris Kurland, To “Aid, Abet, Counsel, Command, Induce, or Procure 
the Commission of an Offense”: A Critique of Federal Aiding and Abetting Principles, 57 
S.C. L. REV. 85, 90 (2005) (“This was a pro-prosecution amendment, which eliminated 
the defense argument that an individual could not be guilty as a principal under 18 
U.S.C. § 2 when he lacked the capacity to commit the actual offense.”). 
33. Id.  This approach was already in effect in the wake of Supreme Court rulings 
in Rothenburg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918), United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41 
(1937), and the Seventh Circuit ruling in United States v. Hodorowicz, 105 F.2d 218 (7th 
Cir. 1939), which all ruled that the issue of class was not germane to the discussion of 
aiding and abetting. 
34. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 18 n.11 (1980).  The Court stated the 
following: 
In 1951, the words “is a principal” were altered to read “is punishable as a 
principal.” That change was designed to eliminate all doubt that in the case of 
offenses whose prohibition is directed at members of specified classes (e.g., 
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cussed in Standefer v. United States, this means that one need only 
aid or abet a principal offender to be among the class covered by 18 
U.S.C. § 2.35  It is not necessary for the offender to be a member of 
a required class of the principal offense to be convicted of aiding 
and abetting a member of that class.36  Further, Congress noted in 
its legislative history that the amendment was intended to settle the 
issue of “class” and not remove the equivalent status of the aider 
and the principal.37  This distinction is critical because the statute 
underlying the topic of this discussion specifies a required class of 
any person “who has been convicted in any court of [ ] a crime pun­
ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”38  While 
18 U.S.C. § 2 may seem plain in language, its application in practice 
has been far from clear.39 
B. Aiding and Abetting Law in Practice 
The aiding and abetting statute is among the most often used 
statutes in federal criminal law.40  This is because the statute at­
taches to all participants in all federal offenses involving multiple 
defendants.41  In fact, it is well established that an aiding and abet­
ting charge need not even be listed in an indictment as it is assumed 
federal employees) a person who is not himself a member of that class may
 
nonetheless be punished as a principal if he induces a person in that class to
 
violate the prohibition.
 
Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  The statute provides a note on legislative intent: 
The section as revised makes clear the legislative intent to punish as a
 
principal not only one who directly commits an offense and one who “aids,
 
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures” another to commit an of­
fense, but also anyone who causes the doing of an act which if done by him
 
directly would render him guilty of an offense against the United States.
 
It removes all doubt that one who puts in motion or assists in the illegal
 
enterprise but causes the commission of an indispensable element of the of­
fense by an innocent agent or instrumentality, is guilty as a principal even
 
though he intentionally refrained from the direct act constituting the com­
pleted offense.
 
Id. § 2 note (Historical and Revision Notes). 
38. Id. § 922(g)(1). 
39. See infra notes 43-68 and accompanying text. 
40. Weiss, supra note 18, at 1346 (“[B]ecause of the doctrine’s applicability to all R 
offenses and to all participants (other than the principal), the aiding and abetting stat­
ute is probably invoked more frequently than any other federal criminal statute.”). 
41. Id. at 1345-46 (“The federal aiding and abetting doctrine applies to ‘the entire 
criminal code,’ so the ‘knowledge versus purposeful intent’ question can arise no matter 
what federal crime is at issue.” (citation omitted)). 
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in all such cases.42  Considering an aiding and abetting charge at­
taches to every case involving multiple defendants, it is reasonable 
to assume that the law in this area is clearly settled.  However, with 
regard to the required mens rea of an aider or abettor, this is far 
from true.43  One commentator described the status of the law in 
this area “as in a state of chaos—a chaos to which the cases seem 
oblivious.”44  Another commentator observed that the law “has 
been spinning out of control for quite some time, [and] has now 
spun totally out of control.”45 
A discussion of the progression of accomplice liability in the 
federal courts could logically begin with Judge Hand’s opinion in 
United States v. Peoni.46  In Peoni, Judge Hand set out the standard 
for aiding and abetting law that is still used today.47  He stated that 
in order to garner an aiding and abetting conviction, the accused 
must “in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he par­
ticipate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he 
seek by his action to make it succeed.”48  This standard, known as 
the “purposeful intent standard,”49 became universally adopted 
when the Supreme Court endorsed Hand’s language in Nye & Nis­
42. United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d 630, 633 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that “[a]iding 
and abetting . . . is an alternative charge in every indictment,” whether it is listed in the 
indictment or not); United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 1180 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting 
that it is clearly settled that a count of aiding and abetting need not be presented to the 
jury if the evidence demonstrates that theory of liability); United States v. Armstrong, 
909 F.2d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Aiding and abetting is implied in every federal 
indictment.”); United States v. Duke, 409 F.2d 669, 671 (4th Cir. 1969) (finding that a 
defendant may be convicted for aiding and abetting even if the indictment only charges 
him with the principal offense). 
43. See Kurland, supra note 32, at 85; Weiss, supra note 18, at 1351. R 
44. Weiss, supra note 18, at 1351. R 
45. Kurland, supra note 32, at 85 (“For decades, prosecutors have successfully R 
used pliant legal doctrines to impose criminal accessorial liability. Today, prosecutors 
are inconsistently applying and misapplying these doctrines to the point of abuse, con­
fusion, and unfairness.” (citations omitted)). 
46. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). 
47. See Weiss, supra note 18, at 1349 (“The commonly held view is that the issue R 
was resolved in 1938, when Judge Learned Hand held in the case of United States v. 
Peoni that the aider and abettor must not only know that his or her act will assist the 
principal, but also want his or her act to assist the principal.” (citation omitted)). 
48. Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402. 
49. Weiss, supra note 18, at 1367. R 
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sen v. United States.50  In Nye, the court described Hand’s test as 
“well engrained in the law.”51 
While this concept may be considered “well engrained in the 
law,” its application has not provided a clear standard to determine 
the mental state of the aider and abettor.52  Interpretation of 
Hand’s test has varied and led to a number of schools of thought 
relative to the required mens rea for aiding and abetting.53  Simi­
larly, federal courts have taken several different approaches on the 
issue.54 
1. Purposeful Intent Standard 
Some courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have chosen a lit­
eral interpretation of Hand’s Peoni standard and mimicked Hand’s 
language from that decision.55  This is referred to now—as it was 
previously—as the purposeful intent standard.  Purposeful intent 
has been described as a state of mind in which the aider not only 
acted to aid the principal, but acted with a desire to bring about the 
crime—a literal reading of Hand’s opinion.56 
50. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1949).  In this case, in­
volving a corporation and its president accused of conspiracy to defraud the United 
States of America, the Court endorsed Hand’s opinion, stating that aiding and abetting 
“makes a defendant a principal when he consciously shares in any criminal act whether 
or not there is a conspiracy.” Id. at 620. 
51. Id. at 618. 
52. Weiss, supra note 18, at 1367. R 
53. Id. at 1372-80. 
54. Id. 
55. See United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that 
aiding and abetting has three elements, requiring “knowledge of the illegal activity that 
is being aided and abetted, a desire to help the activity succeed, and some act of help­
ing”); see also United States v. Hunt, 272 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Folks, 236 F.3d 384, 389 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating aiding and abetting is established by 
showing that the defendant had “knowledge of the illegal activity that is being aided 
and abetted, a desire to help the activity succeed and [participated in] some act of help­
ing” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lanzotti, 205 F.3d 951, 956 (7th 
Cir. 2000))); United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 139, 142-43 (3d Cir. 1974) (“Unknow­
ing participation is not sufficient to constitute an offense under the aiding and abetting 
statute. Rather, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen­
dant participated in a substantive crime with the desire that the crime be accom­
plished.”); Weiss, supra note 18, at 1375. R 
56. See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938); see, e.g., Hunt, 
272 F.3d at 493; United States v. Hill, 55 F.3d 1197, 1204 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Because 
aiding and abetting and the substantive offense are thus linked, courts correctly require 
defendants to possess a degree of knowledge about and intent to further the substantive 
offense.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980); 
Weiss, supra note 18, at 1375. R 
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2. Bad Purpose Standard 
Several courts employ a modified version of the purposeful in­
tent standard called the “bad purpose standard.”  Under the bad 
purpose standard, the aider must act not only with purpose but also 
with an awareness of the unlawfulness of his action.57 
3. Knowledgeable Approach 
Other courts have applied a standard known as the “knowl­
edgeable approach,” which has been broken down into several cate­
gories.58  The first category allows knowledge of one’s actions to 
suffice, except in such cases where the relationship between parties 
is so tenuous that it must be clear that the aider wished for the 
crime to come about.59  The second category of knowledgeable ap­
proach requires purposeful intent except in matters that rise to the 
level of murder or treason, for which knowledge will be the stan­
dard.60  The third approach under the knowledge umbrella requires 
that knowledge is sufficient whenever coupled with a substantial 
act.  This approach recognizes a distinction between substantial and 
lesser acts: for substantial acts, knowledge will be sufficient, but for 
lesser acts, the purposeful intent approach is appropriate.61 
4. Derivative Approach 
The derivative approach, which appears to be the approach ap­
plied by courts that have ruled on aiding and abetting a felon in 
57. See United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476, 486 (6th Cir. 1998).  The court 
stated, 
[I]n United States v. Horton, 847 F.2d 313, 322 (6th Cir. 1988), the court indi­
cated that in order to be guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 2, a defendant must “will­
fully participate[ ] in the commission of a crime . . . . Participation is willful if 
done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something 
which the law forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do something which 
the law requires to be done, that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey 
or disregard the law.” 
Id. (second alteration and omission in original); see also Weiss, supra note 18, at 1375. R 
58. Weiss, supra note 18, at 1375. R 
59. Id. 
60. See United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1235 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) 
(noting that one who aids by leasing a boat or selling a small quantity of drugs to a 
known drug trafficker would not be subject to the harsh punishment under the federal 
“kingpin” statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848); Weiss, supra note 18, at 1375. R 
61. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 225 (1961) (“[G]uilt is personal, and 
when the imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by 
reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal 
activity . . . that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of 
personal guilt.”); see also Weiss, supra note 18, at 1429-85. R 
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possession of a firearm,62 reasons that because the aider is to be 
treated as a principal, the required state of mind of the principal 
should attach to the aider and abettor.63  The other approaches re­
quire review of the accomplice’s mental state, thereby creating dif­
ferences between principals and accomplices rather than treating 
them as equal offenders.64 
If the derivative approach is used, one must study the underly­
ing offense.  Also, the question of whether the statute imposes ac­
complice liability on its own can be determined by studying the 
principal offense. 
II.	 “FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM”—A DISCUSSION OF 
THE PRINCIPAL OFFENSE 
In order to determine what mens rea is required for a convic­
tion for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—felon in possession of 
a firearm65—it is imperative that the language, history, and purpose 
of § 922 is considered.  The statute has had several incarnations, but 
the modern history of the statute centers around the passage of the 
Gun Control Act of 196866 and its successor, the Firearms Owners’ 
Protection Act, passed in 1986.67  These statutes were proposed in 
62. See United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135, 142-43 (11th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 711 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 
1281, 1288 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508, 1527-28 (7th Cir. 1991). 
63. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 881 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1990), withdrawn 
and superseded in part on reh’g by 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Even though he was 
actually convicted only of aiding and abetting others in their violation of section 1505, 
aiders and abettors must possess the same criminal intent as the principals.”); see also 
Weiss, supra note 18, at 1475.  Weiss argues that this must have been Congress’s intent R 
when they chose to eliminate the distinctions between principal offenders and accom­
plices. Id. at 1469. 
64. Weiss, supra note 18, at 1469.  Weiss concludes that a modified version of the R 
derivative approach should be used, in which the only exception to the derivative ap­
proach would be in cases where the accomplice had acted with mere general-intent 
knowledge and his participation was not substantial. Id. at 1486-87.  The example given 
is that of a gas station attendant, who pumps gas for a person, who then drives off to rob 
a bank. Id. at 1487.  In such cases, Weiss argues that a more substantial contribution to 
the crime must be proven. Id. 
65. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). 
66. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 922). 
67. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922); see also JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? 23 
(2002). 
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response to public policy concerns surrounding gun violence and 
gun possession rights.68 
A. The Gun Control Act of 1968 
On April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. was killed by an 
assassin’s bullet.69  Two months later, on June 6, 1968, presidential 
candidate Robert F. Kennedy was also shot and killed.70  In re­
sponse to these tragedies and concerns over increased urban vio­
lence, Congress, at the urging of President Johnson,71 acted to 
strengthen gun laws.72  The result was the Gun Control Act of 
1968,73 the purpose of which was to aid law enforcement in fighting 
crime while avoiding an unnecessary burden on lawful gun 
owners.74 
Included in the Gun Control Act of 1968 was a provision 
known as the “felon-in-possession law.”75  This provision, codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), made it a crime for any person previously 
convicted of a crime punishable by one year or more in prison (a 
felony) to be knowingly in possession of a firearm in interstate com­
merce.76  A violation of this code section is punishable by either a 
fine up to $10,000 or ten years in prison.77  This regulation has been 
referred to as “one of the most important pillars of federal gun con­
trols”78 encompassing, along with convicted felons in its firearm 
prohibition, anyone who “is a fugitive from justice; who is an un­
lawful user of or addicted to marihuana or any depressant or stimu­
lant drug . . . [or] narcotic drug or who has been adjudicated as a 
mental defective or who has been committed to any mental 
institution.”79 
68. See JACOBS, supra note 67, at 23-27. R 
69. Id. at 23. 
70. Id. 
71. Gun Control Act of 1968 § 101; H.R. REP. NO. 90-1577, at 18 (1968), as re­
printed in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4425. 
72. See JACOBS, supra note 67, at 23-24. R 
73. Gun Control Act of 1968 §§ 101-302; see also JACOBS, supra note 67, at 24. R 
74. Gun Control Act of 1968 § 101.  Attorney General Ramsey Clark, in a letter 
to the Speaker of the House, urged the expeditious passage of the bill to “insure that 
strong local or State laws are not subverted by a deadly interstate traffic in firearms and 
ammunition.” H.R. REP. NO. 90-1577, at 19. 
75. See JACOBS, supra note 67, at 25. R 
76. Gun Control Act of 1968 § 102. 
77. Id.; see JACOBS, supra note 67, at 23. R 
78. See JACOBS, supra note 67, at 25. R 
79. Gun Control Act of 1968 § 102. 
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The Senate proposed amendments that would have only 
treated as “felons” those offenders who were indicted or convicted 
of “violent” felonies.80  However, the conference committee chose 
to enact the House of Representatives’ version of that section, 
which included all convicted felons and those under indictment for 
crimes with a penalty in excess of one year in prison.81 
In order to enforce the felon-in-possession law, the Gun Con­
trol Act of 1968 included a provision that prohibited “any licensed 
importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collec­
tor to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammunition to any 
person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such per­
son is” a member of a restricted class.82 
Throughout the eighteen years during which the Gun Control 
Act of 1968 served as the governing law in this area, there were 
concerns that the legislation proved too burdensome on the federal 
government in parts and too burdensome on lawful firearm owners 
in others.83  Finally, after years of pressure, Congress amended the 
Gun Control Act.84 
B. The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act 
In 1986, after numerous attempts to reform and improve upon 
the Gun Control Act of 1968, Congress enacted the Firearm Own­
ers’ Protection Act, which strengthened certain parts of the original 
act while relaxing others.85  As part of the process of drafting the 
new legislation and responding to concerns about the effectiveness 
of the 1968 Act, the House Subcommittee on Crime held hearings 
80. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1956 (1968) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4426, 4428. 
81. Id. 
82. Gun Control Act of 1968 § 101 (emphasis added). 
83. H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 
1329.  The report states, 
There has been substantial concern since 1968 that the Gun Control Act 
had serious omissions that limited its ability to keep firearms out of the hands 
of criminals.  Others have voiced concerns about the impact of enforcement of 
the act upon sportsmen.  In each Congress since 1968 legislation had been 
introduced both to substantially strengthen the Act or to repeal or lessen its 
requirements. 
Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986); 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 1 (“H.R. 4332 is designed to relieve the nation’s sportsmen 
and firearms owners and dealers from unnecessary burdens under the Gun Control Act 
of 1968, to strengthen the [Act] to enhance the ability of law enforcement to fight vio­
lent crime and narcotics trafficking, and to improve administration of the Act.”). 
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in the fall of 1985 and winter of 1986 in New York City, San Fran­
cisco, and Washington, D.C.86  The subcommittee reviewed bills 
proposed by the House and Senate and reported on potential con­
tributions to the Act.87  The subcommittee noted with approval that 
proposed legislation in both chambers would expand the language 
of § 922(d), which until that time provided a penalty for a licensed 
firearms dealer knowingly selling or distributing firearms to a mem­
ber of a restricted class under § 922(g) of the Gun Control Act.88 
The new statute would broaden the scope of that rule by removing 
the word “licensed,” creating liability for any firearms dealers, li­
censed or not.89 
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) also re­
viewed the Senate’s proposed legislation.90  While generally dissat­
isfied with most of the proposed language, the ATF did approve the 
proposed change to § 922(d).91  The ATF report notes, 
Under [the] existing law it is only unlawful for a licensee to sell 
or otherwise dispose of firearms knowing or having reasonable 
cause to believe that such a person is in a prohibited category. 
This proposal would close an existing loophole whereby qualified 
purchasers have acquired firearms from licensees on behalf of 
prohibited persons.92 
The final language of the statute after the 1986 amendments 
reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dis­
pose of any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or 
having reasonable cause to believe that such person . . . is under 
indictment for, or has been convicted in any court of, a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . .93 
Since 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) has remained in place and 
unchanged.94  This is the language courts must parse in order to 
apply the felon-in-possession law. 
86. H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 5. 
87. Id. at 8 (reviewing H.R. Res. 945, 99th Cong. (1986) and S. Res. 49, 99th 
Cong. (1986)). 
88. Id. at 15, 17. 
89. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act § 102. 
90. H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 16. 
91. Id. at 17. 
92. Id. 
93. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (2006). 
94. Id. 
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C. Modern Elements of the Felon-in-Possession Law 
As the current construction of the law, the crime of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm consists of three elements.  First, 
the statute requires that the principal offender be a person “who 
has been convicted in any court of [ ] a crime punishable by impris­
onment for a term exceeding one year.”95  This element has been 
interpreted as a strict-liability offense,96 and thus the principal need 
not be aware of his own status as a convicted felon to be included in 
the class required by § 922(g)(1).97  Second, the principal must 
“ship or transport . . . or possess . . . any firearm or ammunition.”98 
Third, the firearm must be in “interstate commerce” as required by 
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.99  While 
95. Id. § 922(g)(1). 
96. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a strict-liability offense as “[a]n offense for 
which the action alone is enough to warrant a conviction, with no need to prove a 
mental state.  For example, illegal parking is a strict-liability offense.” BLACK’S  LAW 
DICTIONARY 1188 (9th ed. 2009). 
97. See United States v. Jackson, 120 F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Based on 
the law, it does not appear that the district court erred in giving the instruction that it 
was not necessary that Jackson knew that he had been convicted of a felony.”); United 
States v. Miller, 105 F.3d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Caron 
v. United States, 524 U.S. 308 (1998) (“We agree with the decisions from other circuits 
that the § 924(a) knowledge requirement applies only to the possession element of 
§ 922(g)(1), not to the interstate nexus or to felon status.”); United States v. Capps, 77 
F.3d 350, 352 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[A]s far as we can tell, no circuit has extended the 
knowledge component of § 922(g)(1) beyond the act of possession itself.”); United 
States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 604-06 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining there was no evidence 
that Congress intended to reverse prior law by extending the “knowing” requirement to 
require knowledge of interstate nexus); United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 80-82 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (rejecting defendant’s argument that knowledge requirement applies to inter­
state nexus or felon status). But see United States v. Reyes, 194 F. App’x 69, 71 (2d Cir. 
2006) (unpublished table decision) (“[W]e do not find it necessary to rule on the issue 
of whether the felon-in-possession statute requires the government to prove the defen­
dant’s knowledge of his felon status.”). 
98. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  Without delving too deeply into this element, as it is ancil­
lary to the topic of this Note, “possession may be either actual or constructive.”  United 
States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Garrett, 
903 F.2d 1105, 1110 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Constructive possession exists when a person does 
not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a 
given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through 
others.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 728 F.2d 864, 868 (7th 
Cir. 1984))).  Thus, in order to fulfill this element, the principal need not physically 
possess the gun, but may satisfy the element through constructive possession. Garrett, 
903 F.2d at 1110. 
99. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.  This prong will be 
met if the firearm has ever traveled in interstate commerce. That is to say, even if the 
perpetrator never moved the firearm across state lines, it would still be a violation so 
long as the firearm was manufactured or shipped from outside of that state.  See Scar-
borough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 563 (1977).  This case predates the Gun Control 
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these elements have been read without recent controversy regard­
ing the principal offender, it is much less clear which elements apply 
to an aider and abettor. 
III.	 A DISCUSSION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AMONG THE 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 
The issue of whether one must have knowledge of the princi­
pal’s status as a “felon” under 18 U.S.C. § 2 when the underlying 
crime is being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1) has prompted a split amongst the federal circuit courts 
of appeals.  The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that the 
government need not prove any knowledge beyond that of willfully 
aiding the possession of the firearm.100  In contrast, the Third and 
Sixth Circuits ruled that the government is required to prove that 
the aider knew, or should have known, that the principal was a 
member of the class covered in § 922(g)(1).101  The Seventh Circuit 
ruled in 1991 that no knowledge of the principal’s felon status was 
required so long as the aider associated himself in the illegal posses­
sion.102  This case remains good law in the Seventh Circuit; how­
ever, the court has since ruled that knowledge of the principal’s 
status as a felon is a required element of the crime.103  These rulings 
are difficult to distinguish, and this Note will address both ratio­
nales.  The initial cases on both sides of the split arose in the early 
1990s.104  The issue then lay dormant for nearly fourteen years 
before cases in 2007 and 2008 brought the question to the forefront. 
Several recent cases renewed the circuit split.  The Sixth Cir­
cuit joined the Third Circuit and, in United States v. Gardner, re­
quired a heightened level of knowledge was necessary for a 
conviction on aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a fire-
Act but was one in which the court ruled that proof that the possessed firearm “previ­
ously traveled [at some time] in interstate commerce” was sufficient to satisfy the re­
quired nexus between possession and commerce. Id. at 564, 577-78; see also United 
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971) (“[W]e conclude that the Government meets its 
burden here if it demonstrates that the firearm received has previously traveled in inter­
state commerce.”). 
100. See United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135, 142-43 (11th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1993). 
101. See United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 716 (6th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (3d Cir. 1993). 
102. United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508, 1527-28 (7th Cir. 1991); see also 
Klein, supra note 17, at 653-54. R 
103. United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804, 811 (7th Cir. 2008). 
104. See Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281; Canon, 993 F.2d 1439; Moore, 936 F.2d 1508. 
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arm.105  A year later, the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. 
Lesure, ruled in line with the Ninth and Seventh Circuits and held 
that no knowledge was necessary beyond a willful intent to make 
the firearm available to the principal offender.106  However, the 
Seventh Circuit backed off its ruling in Moore, when in 2008 it 
ruled that knowledge of the principal’s status was necessary.107 
Clearly, no trend has taken hold in this area of the law. 
A. Knowledge Requirement: Possession Only 
1. Seventh Circuit 
The original case in this area is United States v. Moore, a 1991 
Seventh Circuit case.108  In Moore, the alleged aider was involved 
as an associate in an armed robbery.109  Moore claimed that he did 
not know the principal offender and thus could not have known 
that the principal was a convicted felon.110  The court, citing Sev­
enth Circuit precedent, implemented the Peoni two-prong test.111 
The test requires the government to prove that the aider associated 
with the principal and participated in the activity.112  The court con­
cluded that the evidence, from which the jury concluded that 
Moore acted with the other defendant, cleared the bar of the “par­
ticipation” prong.113  As for the “association” prong, the court ex­
plained that the aider must have “shared the criminal intent of [the 
principal].”114  In this case, there was a finding that Moore know­
ingly participated along with the principal in a string of robber­
105. Gardner, 488 F.3d at 715-16; see also Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286. 
106. Lesure, 262 F. App’x at 142-43. 
107. Samuels, 521 F.3d at 811. 
108. Moore, 936 F.2d at 1508. 
109. Id. at 1512. 
110. Id. at 1513. 
111. Id. at 1527.  The court recited the established test: 
[T]he aiding and abetting standard has two prongs—association and participa­
tion.  To prove association, the state must prove that the defendant had the 
state of mind required for the statutory offense; to prove participation, [a] high 
level of activity need not be shown . . . . Instead, there must be evidence to 
establish that the defendant engaged in some affirmative conduct; that is, 
there must be evidence that [the] defendant committed an overt act designed 
to aid in the success in the venture. 
Id. (first alteration added) (quoting United States v. Valencia, 907 F.2d 671, 677 (7th 
Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 
401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). 
112. Moore, 936 F.2d at 1527. 
113. Id. (“[W]e have previously determined that the evidence was more than suf­
ficient to demonstrate that Moore was an integral part of the postal armed robbery.”). 
114. Id. (citing United States v. Maya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 756 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
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ies.115  The court then turned to the language of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1).116  The court recited the common understanding of the 
required state of mind for that crime: “defendant knowingly pos­
sessed the gun.”117  The facts of the case demonstrated that Moore 
knew, or should have known, that the principal possessed the gun, 
and it did not matter what else he knew, or did not know, about the 
principal.118  Thus the court applied, while not specifically citing it, 
the derivative approach119 to the aiding and abetting statute.  In do­
ing so the court found that that the evidence was sufficient for a 
finding of guilty on the charge of aiding and abetting a felon in 
possession of a firearm, even though Moore did not know the prin­
cipal was a convicted felon.120  Thus the ruling in Moore requires no 
determination of the alleged aider’s knowledge of the principal’s 
status as a felon.121 
2. Ninth Circuit 
Two years later, the issue was in front of the Ninth Circuit in 
United States v. Canon.122  In that case, two men—both previously 
convicted felons—were involved in a high-speed chase with police 
during which shots were fired at the pursuing officers.123  The court, 
in a less extensive opinion than that of the Seventh Circuit, did not 
cite Moore. Rather, it discussed briefly an earlier aiding and abet­
ting case, Nye & Nissen v. United States,124 which held that the gov­
ernment need only prove that the aider wished to bring about the 
115. Id. at 1528. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. McNeal, 900 F.2d 119, 121 
(7th Cir. 1990)). 
118. Id. 
119. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. R 
120. Moore, 936 F.2d at 1528. 
121. See United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135, 142 (11th Cir. 2008) (contrast­
ing the rulings in Moore and Canon with those of Gardner and Xavier); see also Klein, 
supra note 17, at 653-54.  The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the Seventh Circuit had R 
not directly addressed the issue but stated, “Also, while the Seventh Circuit has not 
directly confronted this particular question, that court has held that a defendant in this 
type of case need only share the principal’s knowledge that the principal possessed a 
gun.”  United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 714 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 
This would seem to lead logically to a conclusion that no knowledge of the principal’s 
status as a felon would be necessary. 
122. United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1993). 
123. Id. at 1440-41. 
124. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1949).  See supra notes 
50-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of Nye & Nissen. R 
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act and that he sought to succeed in his action.125  Because the evi­
dence supported the contention that Canon was willfully involved 
in the act and thus implicitly wished to successfully bring about the 
act, the court found that he could be convicted of aiding and abet­
ting a felon in possession of a firearm.126  It must be noted that the 
sparse opinion in Canon, while still valid law in the Ninth Circuit, 
was subsequently criticized by that court due to a lack of analysis in 
support of its finding.127 
3. Eleventh Circuit 
In light of the lack of support for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Canon,128 one might assume that the courts requiring knowledge 
may be on the decline.  However, the Eleventh Circuit faced the 
same issue in United States v. Lesure and ruled that no evidence of 
further knowledge was necessary for a conviction.129  The court first 
concluded that, because the issue was not properly preserved at 
trial, its review would be only for plain error.130  Citing both the 
circuit split and lack of Supreme Court guidance on the issue, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that “plain error” did not apply in this mat­
ter.131  However, the court did take the opportunity to address the 
issue that had split the circuits.132  The court cited well-settled law 
that asserts that knowledge of one’s own prior felony is not an ele­
ment of § 922(g), and thus the court “would be hard-pressed to re­
quire the government to satisfy a greater knowledge requirement as 
to a § 922(g) aider and abettor.”133  This path of decisions, weak­
ened as it may be, still represents decided, current law in the Ninth 
and Eleventh Circuits. 
125. Canon, 993 F.2d at 1442 (“The government had only to prove [defendant], as 
an aider and abettor, ‘associate[d] himself with [Canon’s crime], that he participate[d] 
in it as in something that he wishe[d] to bring about, [and] that he [sought] by his action 
to make it succeed.’” (first alteration added) (quoting Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 619)). 
126. Id. 
127. United States v. Graves, 143 F.3d 1185, 1188 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Although 
we acknowledge that Canon decided the question whether an aider and abettor is re­
quired to know of the principal’s status as a felon, we have serious reservations regard­
ing the soundness of that determination.  In particular, we note that the decision 
contains no analysis in support of its conclusion . . . .”). 
128. See id. 
129. United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135, 142 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008). 
130. Id. at 141. 
131. Id. at 142-43. 
132. See id. at 142 n.3. 
133. Id. 
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B.	 Knowledge Requirement: Knowledge of the Principal’s Status 
as a Felon 
1.	 Third Circuit 
Three months after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s ruling 
in Canon, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Xavier, became the 
first circuit to require the government to prove that the alleged 
aider possessed greater knowledge, beyond mere awareness of his 
physical actions.134  There, the aider, the principal’s brother, 
claimed that he was improperly convicted because the jury was not 
instructed to consider whether he knew or should have known that 
the principal was a convicted felon.135  The court agreed, noting 
that “criminal liability for aiding and abetting a § 922(g) violation 
stands on a different footing because it depends on the status of the 
person possessing the firearm.”136  The Third Circuit did not ad­
dress the required state of mind of an aider and abettor under 18 
U.S.C. § 2 but, rather, pointed to the greater scheme of the Gun 
Control Act of 1968.137  The court held that the standard for deter­
mining the status of the aider and abettor should be found under a 
§ 922(g)(1) violation because Congress had addressed the aiding 
and abetting of this crime in another section of the statute— 
§ 922(d)(1).138  That section states the following: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of 
any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having rea­
sonable cause to believe that such person—(1) is under indict­
ment for, or has been convicted in any court of, a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year 
. . . .139 
134.	 United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (3d Cir. 1993).  The court 
stated, 
[W]e hold there can be no criminal liability for aiding and abetting a violation 
of § 922(g)(1) without knowledge or having cause to believe the possessor’s 
status as a felon. Unless there is evidence a defendant knew or had cause to 
believe he was aiding and abetting possession by a convicted felon, it has not 
shown a “guilty mind” under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). 
Id.; see also United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1993). 
135.	 Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1284, 1287. 
136.	 Id. at 1286. 
137.	 Id. 
138. Id. (“Defendant was convicted as an aider and abettor under § 922(g) for 
precisely the activity proscribed in § 922(d)—providing a firearm to a convicted 
felon.”). 
139.	 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2006) (emphasis added). 
265 
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The court said that the behavior described in the plain text of 
§ 922(d)(1) is effectively the same behavior that would be the 
source of aiding and abetting of a § 922(g)(1) violation if it were 
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2, and thus Congress intended § 922(d) to 
serve as the aiding and abetting provision for subsection (g).140 
Therefore, “[a]llowing aider and abettor liability under § 922(g)(1), 
without requiring proof of knowledge or reason to know of the pos­
sessor’s status, would effectively circumvent the knowledge element 
in § 922(d)(1).”141  The court ruled that for its decision to comport 
with congressional intent, it must find that § 922(d)(1) is the correct 
statutory language to look at to determine the elements to convict a 
participant of aiding and abetting a previously convicted felon in 
possession of a firearm.142 
2. Sixth Circuit 
After a fourteen-year period between decisions, the Sixth Cir­
cuit, in Gardner, issued an opinion concurring with the Third Cir­
cuit’s decision in Xavier.143  The United States v. Gardner court 
chided the Ninth and Seventh Circuits for the lack of reasoning in 
their rulings and concluded that the Ninth Circuit “provides almost 
no support for its holding.”144  While recognizing that the knowl­
edge of one’s own prior felony conviction may be presumed, and 
thus is not an element to be proven in court, the Sixth Circuit 
noted, however, that a presumption that a third party has knowl­
edge of the principal’s prior conviction is not necessarily a given.145 
The court reasoned that allowing the conviction without evidence 
that the aider knew or should have known the principal’s status 
would effectively write § 922(d) out of the statute.146 
The court presented the following example to illustrate the 
paradox: if a gun dealer sold a gun to a convicted felon without 
knowledge or reason to have knowledge of his felony, he would not 
be criminally liable for the sale of the gun but could be liable for 
140. Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 714-15 (6th Cir. 2007).  “The Ninth 
and Seventh Circuits offer little reasoning for their conclusions . . . . The Third Circuit 
decision, in contrast, is well-reasoned and we concur with it.” Id. 
144. Id.  As noted, this opinion has been echoed by the Ninth Circuit subsequent 
to the Canon ruling. See United States v. Graves, 143 F.3d 1185, 1188 n.3 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
145. Gardner, 488 F.3d at 715. 
146. Id. 
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aiding in the gun possession.147  The Sixth Circuit decided that such 
a situation was untenable, so no further knowledge could reasona­
bly be required of the aider.148 
3. Seventh Circuit Changes Course 
A year later, this conclusion found favor when the Seventh Cir­
cuit addressed the matter again in United States v. Samuels.149  Curi­
ously, this court did not mention the previous Seventh Circuit 
rulings on this question, including Moore.  Rather, the court cited 
other Seventh Circuit case law regarding aiding and abetting of­
fenses in general that held that merely being present was not 
enough to be found an aider or abettor and that knowledge of all of 
the elements of the crime is necessary.150  Based on this rationale, 
the court found that an aider “must know or have reason to know 
that the individual is a felon at the time of the aiding and abetting, 
and, in turn, must assist the felon in possessing a firearm.”151 
While the Seventh Circuit previously held that no knowledge 
of the principal’s status is necessary,152 it is now clear that the cir­
cuit requires such knowledge.153  The court did not fully join the 
Third and Sixth Circuits’ position in assessing aiding and abetting in 
the context of § 922(d) but, instead, demonstrated another path to 
which a court may reach a conclusion in this area and weakened the 
block of “no knowledge required” jurisdictions. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF COURTS’ RATIONALES 
To accept 18 U.S.C. § 2 as the controlling statute for the al­
leged crime of aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a firearm 
without taking into account 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) is to essentially 
write § 922(d)(1) out of the Code.  However, accepting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(d)(1) as the controlling statute without acknowledging the 
broader scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) may make § 2(a) a simple redun­
dancy or perhaps even irrelevant.  As a result, § 2(a), a provision so 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2008). 
150. Id. at 811 (“To be guilty of aiding and abetting, an individual must have 
knowledge of the underlying illegal activity and a desire to assist in the success of the 
activity, and provide an act of assistance.”); see United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508, 
1527-28 (7th Cir. 1991). 
151. Samuels, 521 F.3d at 812. 
152. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. R 
153. Samuels, 521 F.3d at 812. 
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embedded in criminal law that it need not even be plead in an in­
dictment, could be negated by a § 922(d)(1) charge. 
This paradox makes the issue ripe for congressional interven­
tion.  While partisan squabbling may often result in a lack of clarity 
in statutory language and a lack of uniformity in judicial interpreta­
tion (and, indeed, in law review Notes),154 there are basic concepts 
on which a common ground may be found.  Justice Antonin Scalia 
stated, in defense of the strict constructionist judicial outlook, 
“[U]ncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of 
Law.  Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law 
must have the means of knowing what it prescribes.”155  Two years 
later, in a speech extolling the virtues of his colleague Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. noted, “More 
than any other recent member of the Court, Justice Marshall leaves 
a legacy of powerful dissents protesting the curtailment of defend­
ants’ rights—dissents with a vision of fairness and order that is stir­
ring in its clarity.”156  While Justice Scalia is not often likened to 
Justices Brennan or Marshall,157 there is a common thread running 
through those quotes—the need for a sense of order and fairness 
under the law. 
This analysis will seek to find that common ground on this is­
sue.  One need not espouse any ideological view to conclude that 
Congress must act to end confusion in this area of the law or that 
the decisions that do not require a prosecutor to prove knowledge 
of the principal’s status have created inconsistencies in the law.  The 
analysis portion of this Note will suggest an approach that will cre­
ate a logical solution to this problem both in the short term and the 
long term. 
Finding such a solution involves several methods of analysis. 
This analysis will first examine the legislative history of the statute. 
The analysis will next examine the method of statutory interpreta­
tion employed by those courts that have heard this issue.  In doing 
154. Stephen R. Klein in his Note on the subject wrote that “both gun rights and 
gun control advocates alike would like to see uniform application of federal gun laws.” 
Klein, supra note 17, at 658.  Klein approached the issue from a “pro gun owner’s R 
rights” perspective, effectively concluding that a congressional amendment was neces­
sary. Id. at 667. 
155. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1179 (1989). 
156. William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 23, 28 (1991) (emphasis added). 
157. See generally Travis A. Knobbe, Note, Brennan v. Scalia, Justice or Jurispru­
dence? A Moderate Proposal, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1265 (2008). 
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so this analysis will conclude that the Courts of Appeals for the 
Third and Sixth Circuits have offered well-reasoned arguments that 
the statute, when read in its entirety, requires the secondary of­
fender’s knowledge of the principal offender’s status.158  The “no 
knowledge required” courts have read a “plain meaning” into the 
statute, which, rather than simplifying the issue, causes greater 
chaos in this area.159  Thus, this Note will advocate that the most 
logical interpretation of this issue is that of the Third and Sixth Cir­
cuits.  While the Seventh Circuit has now reached the same conclu­
sion, this Note will contend that its reasoning is not as complete as 
those arguing for a knowledge requirement and it may create re­
dundancies within the Code. 
However, in adopting even the most logical approach offered 
by the courts, questions remain as to the true meaning of this stat­
ute.  This Note will present several possible methods of interpreting 
Congress’s intent in drafting the statute, all of which are viable.  For 
that reason, this Note will ultimately suggest that a resolution in this 
area must come from Congress. 
A. Analysis of the Legislative History 
While the courts have not discussed the history of the statute, 
they have offered two starkly different positions on the appropriate 
burden of proof that a prosecutor must reach based on the text.160 
Analysis of the statutory scheme demonstrates that Congress may 
have unwittingly created one loophole while trying to prevent an­
other.  The legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) suggests that 
when the language of that statute was changed from “licensed per­
sons” to “any person,” the idea was to close a loophole that allowed 
non-licensed dealers to sell or dispose of weapons to a felon, who is 
in a prohibited class of firearm possessor under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1), without penalty under that clause.161  However, it may 
be that this amendment actually increased the burden on prosecu­
tors to convict non-licensed aiders.  It would have been reasonable 
to assume that the added knowledge element was only applicable to 
licensed dealers, while all others were subject to the same mental 
state as the possessor, under the former 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1).162 
158. See supra Part III.B. 
159. See supra Part III.A. 
160. See supra Part III.A-B. 
161. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 17 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1327, 1348-49. 
162. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (1970). 
269 
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This stance, as this analysis will establish, is untenable under the 
current construction. 
While Congress may not have intentionally created this loop­
hole, to interpret the statute in any other way than to provide all 
potential aiders and abettors with a requirement of knowledge of 
the principal offender’s status would result in reading § 922(d) out 
of the Code and create more chaos in this area of the law.  This 
point is not discussed by those jurisdictions that have heard the is­
sue, but it is an important element to consider in making a recom­
mendation on how courts should proceed, or in the alternative, how 
Congress should react to confusion in this area of the law. 
In analyzing these rationales, it is important to discuss the 
methods of statutory interpretation employed by those circuits that 
have heard this issue and the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
their analysis as it relates to their interpretation of the crime of aid­
ing and abetting a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922 (g)(1).163 
B. Discussion of Statutory Interpretation 
1. Plain Meaning of the Statute 
It is commonly understood that the first step in interpreting a 
statute is to assess the plain meaning of the language, if such a plain 
meaning exists.164  The plain meaning approach means that courts 
should read statutes with the view that Congress intended the 
words to produce their ordinary meaning.165  It is well acknowl­
edged that if the statute is plainly worded and easily discernable, 
the court should end its analysis of the meaning of the statute at 
that point.166  Thus, the “knowledge required” circuits determined 
that there is no plain reading of the statute because to interpret 
“plain meaning” in the manner that the majority circuits have is to 
163. While this Note will discuss a number of methods of statutory interpretation, 
the focus of this Note is a discussion of the interpretation of the felon-in-possession 
statute. 
164. See RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY IN­
TERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 38 (2002) (“[I]t is assumed that 
the legislature probably used the words, grammar, and punctuation in a ‘normal’ way to 
communicate its intent, so the words, grammar, and punctuation are to be given the 
meaning that they would ordinarily produce when trying to determine the legislature’s 
intent.”). 
165. Id. 
166. See id. 
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simply apply § 2 to the felon-in-possession law, which would create 
chaos in this area of the law.167 
The decisions requiring knowledge of possession rely exclu­
sively on the plain meaning approach when applying aiding and 
abetting to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  The courts reason that 
§ 922(g)(1), standing on its own, does not require knowledge of 
felon status, thus aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) does 
not require knowledge of felon status.168 
While this may seem like a plain reading of the law, this law is 
not “plain,” and these decisions create problems unforeseen by 
those courts.  These problems arise because the statute does not 
stand alone but, rather, within the greater statutory scheme that is 
the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the Firearm Owners’ Protection 
Act, enacted in 1986.169 
It is troubling that courts have interpreted this issue in a man­
ner that nullifies another part of the statute.170  As discussed ear­
lier, § 922(d)(1) provides that anyone who sells or disposes of a 
weapon to a person covered by a restricted class must knowingly do 
so in order to be charged with a crime.171  Using Black’s Law Dic­
tionary’s definition of “aid and abet,” which is “[t]o assist or facili­
tate the commission of a crime, or to promote its 
accomplishment,”172 it would be very difficult to argue that “selling 
or otherwise disposing” of a weapon to a convicted felon would not 
be assisting or facilitating the commission or promoting the accom­
plishment of the crime of being a felon in the possession of a fire­
arm.  These are acts that help the principal commit the offense; by 
their nature these acts have aided him.  Even if the court were to 
reason that aiding and abetting was something other than selling or 
disposing of the weapon, could that action be reasonably seen as 
more culpable than actually handing the felon the firearm?  If Con­
gress has determined that the act of selling or disposing is more 
167. See supra Part III.A. 
168. See supra Part III.A. 
169. See Firearm Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 
(1986); Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213. 
170. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC  STATUTORY  INTERPRETATION 
324 app. (1994) (discussing canons of construction including the problem with reading 
one piece of a statute in such a way as to nullify another piece of the statute); see also 
South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 510 n.22 (1986) (“It is an 
‘elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to 
render one part inoperative.’” (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979))). 
171. See supra Part II.B. 
172. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 81 (9th ed. 2009). 
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culpable and thus a different class of offense, then they must pro­
vide guidance in this area.  This analysis seems far-fetched, and, in 
fact, the courts did not make that argument.173  For these reasons, 
the rationale behind the “no knowledge required” decisions fail. 
2. No Knowledge Requirement Hypothetical 
The following hypothetical demonstrates that this approach is 
untenable.  Assume that, subsequent to the decisions in Canon, 
Moore, and Lesure, a registered, licensed gun dealer ran a back­
ground check174 on a customer who had been convicted of a felony 
but the check erroneously came back without listing a felony.  After 
the consummation of the purchase, the customer is arrested for pos­
sessing the firearm.  The customer is charged as a felon in posses­
sion of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)175 and the dealer is 
charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2.176  Under the Canon­
Moore-Lesure rationale, the gun dealer could be convicted of aid­
ing and abetting the crime because he willfully sold the gun.177 
There would be no discussion of whether he knew or should have 
known that the buyer was a convicted felon because the courts have 
disregarded § 922(d)(1).178  If the jury found that the dealer in­
tended to sell the gun to the principal offender, the dealer could be 
found guilty of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and sentenced to up to 
ten years in prison.179 
173. See United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135 (11th Cir. 2008); United States 
v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508 (7th Cir. 
1991).  Although, in the wake of Samuels, Moore likely does not represent the Seventh 
Circuit’s controlling decision in this matter.  This Note will use this decision to demon­
strate the weakness of those jurisdictions still not requiring the prosecution prove 
knowledge of the principal’s status. 
174. See generally James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Keeping Guns Out of 
the “Wrong” Hands: The Brady Law and the Limits of Regulation, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 93 (1995), for a discussion on gun background checks, which is beyond 
the scope of this Note. 
175. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). 
176. Id. § 2(a). 
177. See Lesure, 262 F. App’x at 142-43; Canon, 993 F.2d at 1442; Moore, 936 
F.2d at 1526-28. 
178. See supra Part III.A. 
179. See 18 U.S.C. § 2.  While it may seem improbable that the buyer would be 
arrested at the consummation of the purchase while committing no crime, this is cer­
tainly a possibility.  Imagine for the purposes of this example that the buyer’s parole 
officer happened to observe the purchase and then notified a police officer.  It is impor­
tant to remember that the crime is possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  While 
this is typically coupled with charges for other criminal acts associated with the posses­
sion, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) stands on its own as a criminal offense and does not require the 
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3. Knowledge of Principal’s Status Required Hypothetical 
What if the same factual situation occurred in the same juris­
diction, but in this case the prosecutor charged the dealer with a 
violation of § 922(d)(1)?180  Assuming that the dealer used reasona­
ble due diligence (a question of fact for the jury), he may be crimi­
nally liable under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1).  The act committed is the 
same and the penalty for a violation of § 2(a) in this circumstance is 
identical to the penalty for a violation of § 922(d)(1).  Both result in 
a fine, a sentence of no more than ten years, or both.181  The only 
difference is that the prosecutor would have a far greater burden 
under § 922(d)(1).182  That being said, under what circumstance 
would a prosecutor bring a charge under § 922(d)(1)?  Considering 
the greater burden, the statute would simply fall to the wayside. 
Therefore, to apply the reasoning of the courts in Canon, Moore 
and Lesure183 is to write § 922(d)(1) out of the Code. 
Assuming the rationale above, it is necessary to move beyond 
the alleged plain meaning of the statute and venture into further 
statutory analysis.  When ambiguity exists between what the statute 
means or which other statutes should apply, it is appropriate to go 
beyond the text to determine the intent of Congress.184  To further 
analyze the statute in front of them, courts should use common ca­
nons of statutory construction.185  This analysis is important to the 
discussion of this issue because it demonstrates the narrow nature 
of the opinions that do not require knowledge of the principal’s 
felon status.186 
possession itself to be accompanied by another crime. See, e.g., Lesure, 262 F. App’x at 
142-43. 
180. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1). 
181. Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), the penalty for a violation of § 2 attaches to the 
principal offense.  Both the principal offense, § 922(g)(1), and the other charged of­
fense, § 922(d)(1), are punishable under § 924(a)(2) by a fine, no more than ten years in 
prison, or both. 
182. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or other­
wise dispose of any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable 
cause to believe that [the person was convicted].” (emphasis added)). 
183. See Lesure, 262 F. App’x at 142-43; Canon, 993 F.2d at 1442. 
184. See EKSRIDGE, supra note 170, at 324 app.; Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on R 
the Theory of Appellate Decision and Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be 
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400-01 (1950). 
185. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 170, at 323-28 app.; Llewellyn, supra note 184, at R 
401-06.  Canons of construction, while not perfect, offer guideposts to ascertaining con­
gressional intent. 
186. Klein did not employ this practice in his piece on the subject. See Klein, 
supra note 17. R 
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4. Canons of Statutory Construction 
Although not referring to the canons of construction specifi­
cally, it appears, based on their explanation, that the Third and 
Sixth Circuits went through the process of analyzing the statute in a 
broader context than did their counterparts.187  The Third and Sixth 
Circuits began by investigating the statutory scheme.188  These 
courts analyzed not only § 922(g)(1) but also the entire statutory 
scheme under which it was written.189  This led the courts to a dis­
cussion of § 922(d)(1).190  They reasoned that Congress must have 
intended § 922(d)(1) to act in conjunction with § 922(g)(1).191 
As one observer has noted, “When a statute is unclear with 
respect to a particular question, lawyers and courts generally begin 
their search for statutory meaning by asking the question: Did the 
legislature intend this particular statutory provision to cover this 
particular fact pattern?”192  In this instance, it seems apparent that 
the general aiding and abetting statute was not specifically intended 
to enforce the “aiding and abetting a felon to possess a firearm” 
fact pattern.193  While § 2(a) may be broad enough to engulf this 
fact pattern, it was undoubtedly not created with these specific facts 
in mind, as it is meant to apply broadly to any offense.194 
After reading § 2(a), the Xavier court ruled that if there is a 
knowledge element to selling or otherwise disposing of a firearm to 
a convicted felon, then there must be a knowledge element to aid­
ing and abetting—which amounts, in many cases, to the same be­
havior.195  This led the court to a discussion of another crucial 
element of statutory construction—reading the statute in such a 
manner as to avoid nullifying another part of the statute.196 
As discussed in the previous section, the court reasoned that if 
it were to implement the logic used by those jurisdictions requiring 
no knowledge of the principal offender’s status as a felon, it would, 
187. See United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 714-15 (6th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (3d Cir. 1993). 
188. Gardner, 488 F.3d at 715; Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286. 
189. Gardner, 488 F.3d at 715; Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286. 
190. See supra Part III.B. 
191. See Gardner, 488 F.3d at 715; Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286. 
192. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTER­
PRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 7 (1997). 
193. See supra Part I.A. 
194. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
195. Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286. 
196. Id.; see  ESKRIDGE, supra note 170, at 324 app. R 
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in essence, write § 922(d)(1) out of the Code.197  The court rea­
soned that § 922(d)(1) would simply fall to the wayside if the same 
behavior was governed by another, broader statute requiring a less­
ened burden of proof and if that statute was preferred by courts and 
prosecutors.198 
The jurisdictions requiring no knowledge of the principal’s sta­
tus never addressed this point in their analyses.199  This is particu­
larly so in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Graves, 
which criticized its own precedent for its lack of analysis, stating, 
“Although we acknowledge that Canon decided the question [of] 
whether an aider and abettor is required to know of the principal’s 
status as a felon, we have serious reservations regarding the sound­
ness of that determination.  In particular, we . . . [see] no analysis in 
support of its conclusion.”200  The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits— 
the two standing rulings requiring no proof of knowledge of the 
principal’s status201—may have found that § 922(g)(1) had no re­
quirement of knowledge for the possessor, but they did not search 
elsewhere in the statute to find other provisions relating to this par­
ticular statute that did create a knowledge element relative to that 
offense or aiding and abetting that offense.  In fact, neither of those 
courts nor the Moore court even mentioned the statutory scheme of 
which § 922(g)(1) was a part.202 
While these courts may argue that the facts of the cases in front 
of them may not have involved selling or even disposing of weapons 
to a prohibited party, the application of the law to those who aided 
or abetted in a manner other than to sell or dispose of firearms is 
dependent on the application of the law as it relates to sellers and 
disposers.  The Canon and Lesure courts failed to mention 
§ 922(d)(1), which, like § 922(g)(1), was enacted as part of the Gun 
Control Act of 1968 and amended as part of the Firearm Owners 
197. See Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286. 
198. See id. 
199. See United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135, 141-43 (11th Cir. 2008) (find­
ing that the district court did not commit plain error and therefore refused to address 
the issue); United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that “no 
greater knowledge requirement applie[d]” but failing to discuss impact on § 922(d)(1)). 
200. United States v. Graves, 143 F.3d 1185, 1188 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998). 
201. While Moore has not been overruled, it is clear that Samuels controls in the 
Seventh Circuit on this issue. See United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
202. See Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135; Canon, 993 F.2d 1439.  It is also notable that 
the Seventh Circuit did not mention the statutory scheme in either Samuels or Moore. 
See Samuels, 521 F.3d 804; United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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Protection Act.203  To ignore this provision was error and causes an 
illogical, inconsistent application of the law. 
Further, legal tradition maintains that in a case of ambiguity, it 
is important to interpret a criminal statute in such a manner as to 
favor the defendant.204  Unlike the jurisdictions in which no knowl­
edge requirement exists,205 the courts requiring knowledge as an 
element read the criminal statute narrowly and require a higher 
standard of proof placed on the prosecutor.206  If Congress meant 
otherwise, it must amend the statute.  Citizens should not be pun­
ished for a congressional failure to clarify.  The appellate courts in 
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits instead chose the broadest and 
harshest interpretation of the statute.207  Broadly reading a statute 
that results in a ten-year prison sentence208 is to ignore this canon 
of construction and is fundamentally unfair. 
While there appears to be at least some ambiguity as to its pur­
pose, the legislature certainly acted with some purpose in creating 
and later amending § 922(d)(1).  It is inappropriate to read a statute 
in such a manner so as to assume that Congress has created a re­
dundancy.209  In a situation such as this, where the legislative his­
tory has led the courts down many paths and Congress has left the 
public with no clear window into its mindset, it is up to the courts to 
interpret the text as best they can to further consistency and logic in 
the law.  For these reasons, it appears that the minority jurisdictions 
have concluded a far more thorough and conclusive discussion of 
the subject matter and come to a more practicable and logical 
result. 
Several hypothetical situations demonstrate the soundness of 
the jurisdictions that require knowledge of the principal’s status and 
the weakness of those jurisdictions that do not.  It is important to 
203. See Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135; Canon, 993 F.2d 1439. 
204. ESKRIDGE, supra note 170, at 324 (discussing canons of construction); see R 
also United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) (“By construing § 241 and 
§ 1584 to prohibit only compulsion of services through physical or legal coercion, we 
adhere to the time-honored interpretive guideline that uncertainty concerning the am­
bit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”). 
205. See Lesure, 262 F. App’x at 140-43; Canon, 993 F.2d at 1441-42; Moore, 936 
F.2d at 1524-28. 
206. United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1286 (3d Cir. 1993). 
207. See supra Part III.A. 
208. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2006). 
209. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 170, at 324 app.; see also Kungys v. United States, R 
485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (“Thus, Justice Stevens’ concur­
rence’s construction violates the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provi­
sion should be construed to be entirely redundant.”). 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE107.txt unknown Seq: 32  4-MAY-10 16:04 
276 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:245 
view the outcomes of these fact patterns not in the context of the 
individual matters in front of the courts, but as they relate to future 
defendants and the legal system in general. 
5. Alleged Aider Advises Principal on Obtaining Firearm 
In this example, assume that the alleged aider is not a licensed 
dealer but merely an acquaintance of the principal offender.  The 
principal, knowing that as a convicted felon he is unlikely to be able 
to purchase a gun legitimately, asks the acquaintance—without re­
vealing why he cannot legitimately purchase a firearm—if the ac­
quaintance has a gun that he can buy.  Now assume that the 
acquaintance does not have a gun to give the defendant but tells the 
defendant he knows where one can be found.210  The acquaintance 
gives the principal directions to a location where he can procure a 
gun along with the name and phone number of the person who will 
sell it to him.  The principal uses that information to obtain the fire­
arm.  Subsequently the principal is arrested and charged with pos­
sessing the gun as a felon.  When asked how he came into 
possession of the gun, the principal claims that the acquaintance 
told him where he could obtain it.  While it may be difficult to find 
that the acquaintance sold or disposed of the gun to the principal 
because he never personally handled the weapon, he certainly 
played a part in the principal’s acquisition of the gun.  Under the 
“counsel” prong of aiding and abetting,211 the acquaintance is 
charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).  In the jurisdictions not requiring 
knowledge, there is no discussion of whether the acquaintance 
knew that the principal was a convicted felon.  Without a finding 
that he knew of the principal’s status, the jury convicts because the 
acquaintance knowingly counseled the principal.  This may or may 
not seem like an unjust result (given that the aider was seemingly 
involved in the illegal firearm trade, he is not likely a sympathetic 
defendant), but the problem with the reasoning underpinning this 
ruling comes when we consider the fate of the person who actually 
handed the gun to the principal. 
210. While this hypothetical may implicate other potential crimes, including aid­
ing and abetting in the possession of an unregistered firearm, for the purposes of this 
discussion, it is important to focus only on the charge of aiding and abetting a felon in 
possession of a firearm. 
211. The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) reads, “Whoever commits an offense against 
the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commis­
sion, is punishable as a principal.”  18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (emphasis added). 
277 
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6. Alleged Aider Hands Firearm to Principal 
In another scenario, assume that when the principal ap­
proaches the acquaintance, the acquaintance does have a gun and 
gives it to the principal.212  Following the same steps as existed in 
the preceding scenario, when the principal is arrested he names the 
person who gave him the gun.  Noting that this action constitutes 
“disposing” of a weapon to a convicted felon, the prosecutor 
charges this defendant with a violation of § 922(d)(1).213  Because 
the standard for § 922(d)(1) requires that the acquaintance be 
aware that the principal is a felon, the burden of proof is higher for 
the prosecutor.214  The prosecutor is not required to prove a state of 
mind when proving that the acquaintance told the principal where 
he could find a gun.215  However, now that the acquaintance actu­
ally placed the gun in the felon’s hands, the prosecutor must prove 
that the acquaintance knew of the principal’s status as a felon.216 
Perhaps, as a matter of public policy, both of these characters 
should be punished, but is it likely that Congress intentionally cre­
ated a statutory provision that creates a lower prosecutorial burden 
for someone who tells a convicted felon where he may find a fire­
arm than for someone who actually hands the convicted felon the 
gun?  That seems unlikely considering the level of participation is 
greater when one puts another physically in possession of a firearm 
than when one merely gives advice on where to acquire a weapon. 
But, alas, if one reads the plain language of § 922(d)(1) to require 
knowledge, but applies § 2(a) to the counseling offense, this would 
be the result. 
A counter to this argument would be that Congress did intend 
a distinction on these matters.  Perhaps Congress presumed that the 
transactions covered by § 922(d) only referred to transactions that, 
besides being conducted with a convicted felon, were otherwise le­
gal.  However, the actions are so closely linked that if this is what 
Congress intended, the statute should state that fact.  As presently 
stated, this approach does not appear sustainable.  Therefore, the 
212. While one may ponder other potential crimes committed in this act, includ­
ing aiding and abetting in the possession of an unregistered firearm, for the purposes of 
this discussion, it is important to focus only on the charge of aiding and abetting a felon-
in-possession of a firearm. 
213. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1). 
214. See id. 
215. Id. § 2(a). 
216. Id. § 922(d)(1). 
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approach of the Third and Sixth Circuits offers the superior 
rationale. 
C.	 Flaws in the Cases Requiring Knowledge of the Principal’s 
Status 
The Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Cir­
cuits, ruling that the aider must have known or should have known 
of the felon status of the principal offender, provide a much more 
in-depth analysis than their counterparts.  The Third and Sixth Cir­
cuits appear to have considered numerous canons of construction 
and explored, in a text-based manner, the statutory scheme and the 
consequences of their rulings from a logical point of view.217  It ap­
pears that the rulings of those courts have a good deal of support 
from traditional canons of construction.  However, this does not 
mean those courts’ analyses were flawless. 
The Seventh Circuit apparently did not consider the rulings of 
its sister circuits—it did not even mention the other decisions or the 
existence of a circuit split, including its own ruling in Moore.218 
Further, the Seventh Circuit seemed to casually assume that in or­
der to satisfy the requirement that a defendant knowingly partici­
pated in an offense, he must be aware of each element.219  For this 
proposition, the circuit cites case law that does not explicitly make 
this claim.220  The Seventh Circuit notes that “[t]o be guilty of aid­
ing and abetting, an individual must have knowledge of the under­
lying illegal activity and a desire to assist in the success of the 
activity, and provide an act of assistance,”221 and that the “[m]ere 
presence at the time of the crime is insufficient to support a convic­
tion for [aiding and abetting].”222  These passages do not conclu­
sively indicate that the aider knows any more than that the 
principal possessed the weapon.  In fact, it is on the basis of similar 
language that the courts not requiring knowledge of the principal’s 
status based their opinions.223  Further, it is impossible to determine 
217.	 See supra Part III.B. 
218.	 See United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2008). 
219.	 Id. at 811-12. 
220. Id. at 811 (citing United States v. Serrano, 434 F.3d 1003, 1004 (7th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Stott, 245 F.3d 890, 904 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
221.	 Samuels, 521 F.3d at 811. 
222. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bounty, 383 F.3d 
575, 579 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Stott, 245 F.3d at 904 (“To be convicted as an aider 
and abettor, it must be shown that Mr. Ford associated himself with the activity at issue 
and that he tried to make the activity succeed.”). 
223.	 See supra Part III.A. 
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whether the Seventh Circuit considered § 922(d) as there is no 
mention of it in its decision.224  Perhaps they view this section as 
redundant or perhaps they never considered its implications in this 
area.  Thus, while the Seventh Circuit has reached a practicable so­
lution and seemingly overturned or at least clarified its ruling in 
Moore, Samuel’s lack of support and failure to address alternative 
arguments prevent it from controlling on this matter. 
One criticism of the analyses of the Third and Sixth Circuit 
Courts of Appeals is that the courts used statutory construction ca­
nons exclusively.225  Heavy reliance on canons of construction may 
be easy to manipulate,226 which is why some jurisdictions ignore 
them and leave Congress the responsibility of resolving ambigui­
ties.227  In this case, however, so many key canons of construction— 
which hold together the logic of the Code—fall into place that it is 
difficult to accuse these courts of selective reading.  This is particu­
larly so considering that the elements regarding restricted classes of 
firearm possessors mentioned in § 922(g)(1) are similarly men­
tioned in § 922(d)(1).228  It would be irresponsible to ignore this 
language when Congress connected the two passages by 
reference.229 
A far more significant criticism of these courts involves the in­
tent of Congress as seen through the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922.  Using legislative history in statutory interpretation is a con­
troversial practice and is considered by some as an inappropriate 
judicial exercise.230  However, for the purposes of this discussion, it 
is important to analyze whether the courts’ analyses are in line with 
congressional intent, as this is where the rationale of the Courts of 
Appeals for the Third and Sixth Circuits can be called into ques­
tion.  The original language of § 922(d)(1) only required knowledge 
of licensed dealers of firearms.231  In the Firearms Owners’ Protec­
tion Act, the term “licensed” was dropped.232  It is important to 
discuss why this change was made, as it may give the courts gui­
224. See Samuels, 521 F.3d 804. 
225. See United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 714-15 (6th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1286 (3d Cir. 1993). 
226. See Llewellyn, supra note 184 at 401-06. R 
227. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 192, at 30-31. R 
228. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1), (g)(1) (2006). 
229. Id. § 922(d)(1), (g)(1); see Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286. 
230. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 192, at 29-33. R 
231. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1220. 
232. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1)). 
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dance as to the purpose of § 922(d).  None of the courts that have 
ruled on this matter addressed the issue of legislative history.  As 
discussed earlier, the license requirement was thought to have cre­
ated a loophole for offenders who were not licensed.233  In eliminat­
ing this requirement, it seems that Congress intended one of three 
possibilities. 
The first possibility is that Congress did not understand the 
aiding and abetting law or its application.  The House Report states 
that there was “an existing loophole whereby qualified purchasers 
have acquired firearms from licensees on behalf of prohibited per­
sons.”234  Considering that even after the amendment broadened 
the statute courts still find that 18 U.S.C. § 2 applies to this of-
fense,235 it is hard to fathom that a loophole existed that allowed 
non-licensees to dispose of guns to prohibited classes without facing 
an aiding and abetting charge.  In fact, no case law supports this 
charge. 
Considering the rationales of the post-1986 courts, it seems far 
more plausible that the burden of proof for prosecuting a non-
licensed provider was lower before the statute was amended.  If 
§ 922(d)(1), as enacted in 1968, specified that it only referred to 
licensees, it would not be unreasonable to assume that all others 
who aided a felon in possession of a firearm were subject to some 
other statute, in which case they would almost certainly be prose­
cuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2.  This Note argues that great inconsisten­
cies would result under the modern language if a knowledge 
element was not required; there would be no such problem in the 
pre-1986 version of the statute, however, because a distinction 
could be made between licensees and non-licensees.  In a case with 
the same facts as Samuels, Gardner, or Xavier, a court could rea­
sonably say that because Congress did not include non-licensees 
under § 922(d)(1), they were not meant to have the same required 
mens rea as a licensee.  Because they were not granted this right, it 
could follow that they are subject to the same mens rea as the prin­
cipal.  Thus, it may have been that Congress did not understand this 
avenue or prosecutors chose not to employ it. 
Second, it is also possible that Congress saw § 922(d) as the 
aiding and abetting statute for a felon-in-possession charge and thus 
233. H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 17 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 
1343.  The House Report included an ATF report that addressed the loophole. See 
supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. R 
234. H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 17. 
235. See supra Part III.A. 
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wanted to include all possible circumstances under that provision. 
While there is no discussion in the legislative history of the inclu­
sion of a knowledge element, it is possible that Congress assumed 
that knowledge of the underlying crime was necessary for all aiders 
and abettors in violation of § 922(g)(1) and thus wanted to be sure 
that all potential offenders were covered by this provision.  How­
ever, if this were the case, it would follow that Congress would not 
only have broadened the classifications of persons covered by 
§ 922(d)(1) but also the conduct.  Perhaps rather than “sell or oth­
erwise dispose” it could have stated, “aid or abet in any way.” 
However, because Congress changed only the class of person in­
cluded in the statute,236 we are left with an unclear understanding 
of its motives on this topic. 
A third possible reason for a congressional amendment would 
be to ensure that all aiders and abettors of a felon in possession of a 
firearm to whom the knowledge element did not apply would now 
have that protection.  There is no evidence of this in the legislative 
history, but, considering the tradition of including or allowing a 
court to read a knowledge requirement into a statute, it is entirely 
possible that this was on the minds of at least some members of 
Congress.237  This may be especially true considering the substantial 
penalty associated with this crime.238 
The counterargument could be that Congress may have inten­
tionally created a distinction.  While this appears unlikely based on 
the language of § 922(d), which includes the word “dispose,”239 and 
the legislative history, which seems to show an intent to strengthen 
the law against those who do sell or dispose a firearm, it is of course 
possible that through its silence on the matter, Congress intended 
to punish the counselor more than the procurer.  If this was Con­
gress’s intent—to create a distinction—then that body should in­
clude language to such effect in the statute.  At present, there is no 
such language in either the statute or the legislative history. 
236. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1). 
237. Margaret Shaw, Note, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Rele­
vancy of the Public Welfare Doctrine in Determining Culpability, 27 NEW  ENG. J. ON 
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 337, 349-50 (2001) (acknowledging that the harshness of a 
penalty may affect the level of mens rea required). 
238. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(b). 
239. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Note has demonstrated the ambiguous nature of aiding 
and abetting law, particularly as it relates to the felon in possession 
of a firearm statute.  Decisions favoring an interpretation not re­
quiring the aider to have knowledge of the principal’s offense may 
be on the decline.  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit— 
formerly thought to favor this approach—now offers a practicable 
solution.240  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit appears du­
bious of—if not yet ready to overturn—its ruling on this matter.241 
And the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued its opin­
ion only after acknowledging that due to the split it could not over­
rule the district court as plain error (possibly placing its opinion in 
the realm of dicta).242  However, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits 
still employ the “no knowledge of the principal’s status” standard. 
And even those courts that require the government to prove knowl­
edge of the principal’s felon status—the Courts of Appeals for the 
Third and Sixth Circuits, along with the Seventh Circuit, concurring 
in result—can only guess as to Congress’s intentions. 
Congress ultimately has the ability to resolve this matter.  The 
courts may offer different interpretations of the meaning of the 
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act243 as it relates to aider and abet­
tor law, but Congress, with one pen stroke, could end the ambiguity 
by clarifying any of the possible reasons for the 1986 amendments 
mentioned above or by providing any other clear solution it so 
chooses.  Congress need merely speak in § 922(d)(1) to exactly 
which acts are to be covered by the provision.  Congress should ei­
ther clarify that 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) is intended to cover all areas 
of aiding and abetting for a violation of § 922(g) or more specifi­
cally describe what behavior it covers.  While it may seem that the 
behavior described by § 922(d)(1) is covered by general aiding and 
abetting law, the statute does not cover such issues as “counsel and 
240. See United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804, 811-12 (7th Cir. 2008). 
241. “Although we acknowledge that Canon decided the question whether an 
aider and abettor is required to know of the principal’s status as a felon, we have seri­
ous reservations regarding the soundness of that determination.  In particular, we [see] 
no analysis in support of its conclusion . . . .”  United States v. Graves, 143 F.3d 1185, 
1188 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1998) 
242. United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135, 142 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is nota­
ble to observe at the outset that ‘[w]hen neither the Supreme Court nor [we have] 
resolved an issue, and other circuits are split on it, there can be no plain error in regard 
to that issue.’” (quoting United States v. Evans, 478 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 2007))). 
243. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986). 
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command” like § 2.244  Are these issues then to be decided sepa­
rately?  Congress, after eighteen years, chose to amend the Gun 
Control Act of 1968 in an attempt to focus the language of the stat­
ute.  As noted earlier, it took many years and several attempts 
before Congress successfully amended that statute.  While similar 
hurdles are likely to exist should further clarification be attempted, 
this is a task that must be undertaken.  Political difficulties do not 
provide an adequate excuse for leaving the statute as presently 
constructed. 
Perhaps certiorari should be requested, but even a Supreme 
Court review would leave certain questions unanswered.  For exam­
ple, neither of the two most recent cases addressed the issue of 
counsel and command.  The burden in this instance is on Congress. 
Aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a firearm is accom­
panied by strict punishment.245  Existing law dictates that an act 
punishable by up to a ten-year prison sentence in one jurisdiction 
may bring no penalty at all in another.246  The Third and Sixth Cir­
cuits have provided a well-reasoned, logical ruling on the statute as 
it stands.  However it is not preferable to have courts choosing be­
tween statutes and guessing at congressional rationale when Con­
gress could amend this law and considerably clarify this area of the 
criminal code. 
James O’Connor 
244. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d). 
245. Id. § 924(b)(1). 
246. Id. 
